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INTRODUCTION
Whenever a legal system has to consider natural resources for human use, it needs to consider carefully all the physical, chemical, hydrogeological, environmental interconnections. Groundwater can be
no exception. Political, social, and economic "interconnections" are of
equal importance with the physical ones. The need for simultaneous
emphasis on all of them has been known for a long time, at least academically, but institutional accommodation has been lacking for too
long.'
At the opening of the twenty-first century, hydrogeology and law
still are not wholly integrated ....

The intertwined relationship be-

tween law and hydrogeology, that has had a long-established history,
will become even more intimate in the future.!
Beginning with the first compact between Maryland and Virginia in
1785 designating the waters in the Potomac River as a "common highway,"' American states have sought means to settle, quantify and allo1. JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 18.06 (1991 ed. repl.
vol. 2003) [hereinafter DELLAPENNA].
2. Id. §18.02.
3. DAN SELIGMAN, COLO. RIVER COMM'N OF NEV., "LAws OF THE RIVERS:" THE LEGAL
REGIMES OF MAJOR INTERSTATE RIVER SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES 225-26 (Oct. 2006).
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cate rights to the nation's interstate waters.' In the American West, at
least since 1922, when Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, New Mexico, California, and Nevada adopted the Colorado River Compact,' followed in
1928 by the Congress,' states have again sought means to settle, quantify, and allocate their competing rights to interstate surface water systems. In recent decades, as hydrologists have more accurately estimated the hydrologic volume of surface water supplies, where demands for supply have become greater, where entities have imposed
environmental servitudes upon the supplies' natural flow, underground7 water is becoming an ever more important resource.
In 1995, Professor Abrams analyzed the problem of the security of
water rights in interstate water systems before and after the allocation
of the volume of those systems between the involved states.' Acknowledging the three established methods of equitable apportionment,
congressional allocation, and interstate compact, he posited that individual rights are more secure once conferred under the "umbrella" of
a state's apportionment.9 However, Abrams observed that water users
have traditionally made use of interstate waters without awaiting legal
pronouncements of interstate allocation:"0
[The] rights to interstate water exercised in advance of interstate allocations are not secure.

The hard cases, and the interesting cases, are the ones that seek security in advance of allocation. Here the pathways to security are less
clear. Real-world self help (going out and making use of the water
4. Id. at 26, 28 (with respect to these waters, this paper uses the words "interstate"
and "shared" interchangeably).
5. Id. at 71, 73 (Arizona did not adopt the 1922 Compact until 1944).
6. Id. at 73.
7. The proper form of reference to underground water seems to differ depending
upon the writer. Here, the convention used is that "ground" is an adjective when used
to modify the noun "water" (as with "surface water"), but a noun when used as one,
e.g., "buried in the ground." The two words "ground" and "water" are therefore not
merged. "Groundwater" is an adjective but not a noun. Thus the two words "ground"
and "water" are merged when the adjective is used to modify a different noun, e.g.,
"groundwater supply." (Compare Slater's style that hyphenates such merged adjectives.
See infra note 125.)
8. Robert H. Abrams, Secure Water Rights in Interstate Waters, in WATER LAw: TRENDS,
POLICIES, AND PRAcTncE, 332 (Kathleen Marion Carr & James Crammond eds., A.B.A_
SEC. OF NAT RESOURCES, ENERGY, ENVTL. L. 1995). Professor Abrams presumes that the
equitable apportionment rationale of the U.S. Supreme Court is essentially that of the
international law concepts upon which cross-border water bodies are shared. See also
Gabriel Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein, A HydrogeologicalApproach to Transboundary Ground
Water Resources and InternationalLaw, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 201, 205 (2003).
9. Abrams, supra note 8, at 331.
10. Id.
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before anyone else does) can succeed because priority of use enjoys a
measure of protection in subsequent allocation litigation. Still, the
advantage of priority is not absolute and those seeking greater security will have to be inventive or find a less risk-averse banker."

Security of the water right is, of course, not the only concern. Sustainability of the resource, environmental service, and efficiency of
regulatory management must also be considered. In 2001, Professor
Sax urged the importance of reconciling "hydrologic reality (or rationality)" with "managerial practicability" when considering watershed
management:
One profoundly important question as one ponders watershed management is to what extent we may have to break problems down into
artificial units simply to be able to cope with them at all. The watershed, or whatever the hydrologically-rational unit may be, usually
bears little if any relationship whatever to governmental units at any
level-from the county to the country. Nor is there any hydrological or
ecological measure of managerial capacity. 2

Western American states' water law is part of the law of conquest 3
or capture: 4 superlative ("I killed it, it's mine to eat."); declarative ("it's
mine, I used it first." (albeit after many others)); and diminutive
("can't you see, I've marked all the corners."). Likewise, the sovereignty America's western states assert with respect to water within their
boundaries is assertive and protective, reflecting the dog-in-the-manger
attitude of their respective citizens ("It's mine even if I'm not using it. I
might get thirsty.") .,

Notwithstanding that assertiveness, the role of comity between the
states, the mandates of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, 16 and the overarching cloud of the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution' necessarily constrain the states' claims to inter-

11.
Id. at 334-35.
12. Joseph L. Sax, Boalt Hall Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley, Keynote Address at the 19th
Annual Water Law Conference, Watershed Management: A New Governance Trend:
Issues in the Watershed Management Movement (Feb. 15, 2001) (transcript available
at A.B.A. Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources).
13.
See ANDERS STEPHANSON, MANIFEST DESTINY: AMERIcAN EXPANSION AND THE
EMPIRE OF RIGHT 14, 54 (1995).
14. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Out-of-Priority Water Use: Adding Flexibility to the Water
AppropriationSystem, 83 NEB. L. REv. 485 (2004).
15.
Id. at 488, 490.
16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.").
17. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
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state water, be it surface or ground water. As the U.S. Supreme Court
has stated in the equitable apportionment context, no state can impose
its law on another, and no state must yield to another's law.'" The
rights and responsibilities of U.S. states to control natural resources
and the limitations of their claims to those natural resources under the
jurisprudence of equitable apportionment, the Commerce Clause,'9
and the Compact Clause2 ' deserve some thought. Is there a fourth approach to interstate water management, perhaps a hybrid or a variant,
which is especially suited to interstate ground water? That complex
resource may indeed require a unique approach adapted to the unique
attributes of individual aquifers.
I. THE INTERESTS OF SOVEREIGN STATES
The right and responsibility of U.S. states to control the natural resources within each state's boundaries arises from the American colonies' inheritance of England's common law. Under the common law,
the King and derivative owners of land with chain of title to royal control, owned all the natural waters, forests, game, minerals, and profits
upon or under the land.2 ' When the thirteen American colonies released English royal claims by Declaration of Independence, each state
asserted the same governmental ownership or control of the waters,
forests, games, minerals and profits within their boundaries." That
claimed jurisdiction was not surrendered by the Articles of Confederation in 1787 or transferred to the United States government by the U.S.
Constitution.2" As new states entered the union, each entered on
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
18. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97-98 (1907).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,.
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.").
21. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 283 (1997); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479 (1988) ("[I]t came to be recognized as the
'settled law of this country' that the lands under navigable freshwater lakes and rivers
were within the public trust given the new States upon their entry into the Union,
subject to the federal navigation easement and the power of Congress to control navigation on those streams under the Commerce Clause") (citation omitted); Montana v.
Cent. R.R Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 545 (1981); Ill.
(1892); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842) (states as sovereigns "hold
the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own
common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the
general government."); JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 462
(3d ed. 2000).
22. SAX ETAL., supra note 21, at 462.
23. Id. Compare Katie O'Bryan, Issues inNatural Resource Management - Inland Water
Resources - Implicationsof Native Title and the Future of Indigenous Control and Management
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"equal footing" with those original thirteen. 4 That is, each new state
was presumed to be endowed with all the same governmental rights
and privileges as the original thirteen, including sovereignty with respect to all natural resources within the particular territory. 5 One such
presumed right is a state's right of ownership, or at the minimum management, of natural resources, including water, within the limits of its
political jurisdiction.
Various western state enabling acts or constitutions address jurisdiction over natural resources, generally, and water in particular. Wyoming's Constitution declares, for example, that "[t]he water of all the
natural streams, springs, lakes or collections of still water, within the
boundaries of the state are . . .the property of the state."2'6 Likewise,

Colorado's Constitution states that "[t] he water of every natural stream,
not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby
declared to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to
the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided." 7 Montana's Constitution provides that all the water
within the state, including underground water, is the property of the
state, and that all uses of that water are "public use [s]," notwithstanding the user or the purpose. 8 New Mexico's Constitution declares that
all the "water of every natural stream, perennial or torrential, within
the state" unappropriated at the time of statehood, "belong[s] to the
public."' California's Constitution provides that "the use of all water"
by appropriation is a "public use, and subject to the regulation and
control of the state."30
While Nevada's Constitution does not specifically address the public's ownership of water, Nevada's legislature stated clearly in 1913 that
"the water of all sources of water supply within the boundaries of the
state whether above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to
of Inland Waters, 14 Murdoch U. E-LawJ. 280, 281-82 (Oct. 2007) (discussing Australian
constitutional law), availableat https://elaw.murdoch.edu.au/index.html.
24. SAXETAL., supranote 21, at 462.
25. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 221, 222-23 (1845); County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 68 (1874); Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 202
(1987). Before statehood, the U.S. may reserve the lands underlying navigable waters
for federal purposes if it clearly expressed the intent to do so.

26.

Wyo. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.

27.

COLO. CONST. art. XVI,

§ 5.

28. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3 ("(2) The use of all water that is now or may hereafter be appropriated for sale, rent, distribution, or other beneficial use, the right of way
over the lands of others for all ditches, drains, flumes, canals, and aqueducts necessarily used in connection therewith, and the sites for reservoirs necessary for collecting
and storing water shall be held to be a public use. (3) All surface, underground, flood,
and atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the state are the property of the state
for the use of its people and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law.").
29. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
30.

CAL. CONST. art. 10,

§ 5.
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the public."'" North Dakota's legislature declared both surface and
ground water to "belong to the public,""' as did Utah's," Oregon's, 4 and
Nebraska's" legislatures. Washington's legislature declared that "all
waters within the state belong to the public," again subject to rights
existing prior to that declaration. Idaho's legislature declares that all
its waters belong to the state. 7 California's statute declares only that
surface waters are "public water of the State." 8 Likewise, Texas law also
declares that surface water is the "property of the state." 9 Private rights
to use water in these states are thus encumbered with the constitu-

31.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025 (2007).
32. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01 (2008).
33.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (2008) ("All waters in this state, whether above or
under the ground are hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all
existing rights to the use thereof.").
34.
OR. REV. STAT. § 537.110 (2007) ("All water within the state from all sources of
water supply belongs to the public.").
35.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-202(1) (2007) ("The water of every natural stream not
heretofore appropriated within the State of Nebraska, including the Missouri River, is
hereby declared to be the property of the public and is dedicated to the use of the
people of the state, subject to appropriation."); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-702
(2007) ("All water within the state of Kansas is hereby dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to the control and regulation of the state in the manner herein
prescribed.").
36. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.010 (2008) ("The power of the state to regulate and
control the waters within the state shall be exercised as hereinafter in this chapter
provided. Subject to existing rights all waters within the state belong to the public, and
any right thereto, or to the use thereof, shall be hereafter acquired only by appropriation for a beneficial use and in the manner provided and not otherwise; and, as between appropriations, the first in time shall be the first in right. Nothing contained in
this chapter shall be construed to lessen, enlarge, or modify the existing rights of any
riparian owner, or any existing right acquired by appropriation, or otherwise.").
37.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-101 (2008) ("All the waters of the state, when flowing in
their natural channels, including the waters of all natural springs and lakes within the
boundaries of the state are declared to be the property of the state, whose duty it shall
be to supervise their appropriation and allotment to those diverting the same therefrom for any beneficial purpose, and the right to the use of any of the waters of the
state for useful or beneficial purposes is recognized and confirmed; and the right to
the use of any of the public waters which have heretofore been or may hereafter be
allotted or beneficially applied, shall not be considered as being a property right in
itself, but such right shall become the complement of, or one of the appurtenances of,
the land or other thing to which, through necessity, said water is being applied .
.
38.
CAL. WATER CODE § 1201 (West 2008).
39. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021 (2007) ("(a) The water of the ordinary flow,
underflow, and tides of every flowing river, natural stream, and lake, and of every bay
or arm of the Gulf of Mexico, and the storm water, floodwater, and rainwater of every
river, natural stream, canyon, ravine, depression, and watershed in the state is the
property of the state. (b) Water imported from any source outside the boundaries of
the state for use in the state and which is transported through the beds and banks of
any navigable stream within the state or by utilizing any facilities owned or operated by
the state is the property of the state.").
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tional or statutory reservation of states' sovereign powers" Professor
Tarlock remarked "[s]tates, especially in the West, have traditionally
asserted not only the power to set the ground rules for the recognition
of private rights, but also the power to deny or to constrain private use
choices to further broad community interests in water allocation.""
In 2003, Professor Leshy declared state administration of water
rights "lax" - exacerbating almost every water rights dispute in the West
through uncertainty about water measurement, management, and administration.2 Moreover, he declared the lax, status quo management
was preferable to states and water rights holders because of the greater
cost associated with "tighter management. ' "" According to Leshy, "[i] t
requires outlays for devices to measure and keep track of water use, for
courts to adjudicate rights, and for bureaucracies to administer the
system.... It is politically costly to change to tighter control.""

40. There is, of course, disagreement on this issue. See Conference Materials, Alf
W. Brandt, Cal. Assembly Comm. on Water, Parks & Wildlife, An HistoricalPerspective on
Water Ownership in Bureau of Reclamation Projects, at the A.B.A. Section of Environment,
Energy, and Resources 24th Annual Water Law Conference (Feb. 23-24, 2006) [hereinafter 24th Annual Water Law Conference] (on file with American Bar Association);
Steven L. Hernandez, Hubert & Hernandez, P.A., Las Cruces, New Mexico, Ownership
of Water Rights in Reclamation Projects:A Lesson from New Mexico, at 24th Annual Water Law
Conference, Clifford T. Lee, Deputy Attorney Gen., Cal. Dep't of Justice, A California
Perspective on the Water Right Ownership Issue, at 24th Annual Water Law Conference,Nancie
G. Marzulla, Marzulla & Marzulla, Washington, D.C., Water, Property Rights, and Endangered Species, at 24th Annual Water Law Conference Christopher B. Rich, Senior Attorney,
Intermountain Reg'I Solicitor's Office, Dep't of Interior, Can You Own a Usufruct? Or
Why the Concept of Ownership May Not Be the Most Apt Description of a Water Right, at 24th
Annual Water Law Conference. See also James H. Davenport & Craig Bell, Governmental
Interference with the Use of Water: When Do Unconstitutional 'Takings' Occur?, 9 U. DENV.
WATER L. REv. 1, 25, 33 (2005); Alf W. Brandt, U.S. Dep't of Interior, 21st Water Law
Conference, Water Project Deliveries = Property?, at the A.B.A. Section of Environment,
Energy, and Resources. 21st Annual Water Law Conference (Feb. 20-21, 2003) (on file
with American Bar Association).
41. A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and Restated,56 U. COLO. L. REv. 381, 389-90 (1985).
42. John D. Leshy, Distinguished Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal., Hastings School of
Law, The Federal Role in Water Management in the West: Time for New Thinking?, at A.B.A.
Section of Environment, Energy and Resources 21st Annual Water Law Conference
(Feb. 20-21, 2003).
43. Id.
44. Id. Professor Leshy also attributed preference for lax administration to the
"rugged individualism" of those dependent on government-sponsored water projects,
"the lingering Reagan-era legacy that government tends to be incompetent and foul
things up whenever it gets involved," the temporary duration of shortages and genuine
constraints on water use, the arrival of public money for more water projects to provide
more storage and new supplies when shortages occur, and scapegoats such as Indians,
federal agencies, environmentalists, the Endangered Species Act, and the Clean Water
Act. Id.
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Generally speaking, states sharing interstate surface water systems
respect each other's laws regarding the creation of water rights. A California statute is a good example:
Upon any stream flowing across the State boundary, an appropriation

of water in this State for beneficial use in another State may be made
only when, under the laws of the latter, water may be lawfully diverted
therein for beneficial use in this State.
Upon any stream flowing across the state boundary a right of appropriation having the point of diversion and the place of use in another
state and recognized by the laws of that state shall have the same force
and effect as if the point of diversion and the place of use were in this
State if the laws of that state give like force and effect to similar rights
acquired in this State ......
Notwithstanding its movement, all water "resides" somewhere. Its
residence within any state makes that water an intrastateresource. But,
as a portion of a resource that resides in more than one state, it is also
an interstateresource.

H.

EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT

The Supreme Court exercises original and exclusive jurisdiction
over suits between states.46 Only that Court, finding facts through a
special master, may entertain equitable apportionment litigation between states.47 In order to secure the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over interstate equitable apportionment cases, the plaintiff state
must prove injury." Sometimes state ownership of the resource or a
state's parens patriae responsibility for the protection of the private interests of its citizens is the premise for standing.49
Each state is entitled, of course, to some reasonable share of the
common resource. States' sovereign rights under the American federal
CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1230, 1231 (West 2008).
U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 1 (extending the judicial power of the United States
"to Controversies between two or more States"); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (stating
that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction "in all Cases... in which a State shall
be Party"); 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006) (providing the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction over a suit is "between two or more States.").
47. See Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows ofJudicial Process: Special Masters in the Supreme Court's OriginalJurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REv. 625, 653, 655
(2002).
48. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 386-87, 392 n.2 (1943); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S 517 (1936); Tarlock, supra note 41, at 394 (" ... if all claims, perfected or
not, on a stream exceed the dependable flow, then a conflict exists and injury should
be presumed.") (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 610 (1945)). See also Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 463 (1931).
49. Tarlock, supra note 41, at 389-91 (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589,
610 (1945)).

45.
46.

Issue I

LIMITED APPROACH TO MULTI-STATE MANAGEMENT

system stand on equal footing. The Supreme Court views states' competing claims to natural resources on the same premise. No state can
impose its law on another, and no state must yield to another's law.50
The objective of fair allocation guides the substantive law of equitable
apportionment." The Court applies federal common law to determine
each state's share." The Court's primary objective is to make an "equitable apportionment ''of benefits between the ... States resulting from
the flow of the river. 5
Fair allocation rather than consistency with locally generated expectations became the touchstone of equitable apportionment. Local law
remains, however, central to an equitable apportionment inquiry. Although the Court has never been very precise about the source of the
law of equitable apportionment, its early decision makes it clear that
the grant of original jurisdiction requires a federal law and a federal
law that will not allow one state to use its law to gain an unfair advantage over another.54
But local law may serve as a source of principles to apply since a federal common law must of necessity examine the most relevant sources
of substantive law. 55

As local law is not determinative, the idea of superiority of rights,
whether by prior appropriation 6 or otherwise, is not controlling upon
the Supreme Court. Nor is the Court bound by the variance between
two states' riparian or appropriative water law origins. 7 "[A]ll the factors which create equities in favor of one State or the other must be
weighed.... ,,""
According to Abrams, "[t] he concept of entitlement to
50. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907).
51. See id. at 98.
52. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982) (citing Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907) (characterizing the body of law as "interstate common law")).
53. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 118 (1907). See also Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589 (1945).
54. Tarlock, supra note 41, at 394 (citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938)).
55. Id. at 395 (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972)).
56. MacDonnell, supra note 14, at 486 ("Priority is, however, a purely temporal basis
for establishing rights. It says nothing about the nature of the use, its economic or
social value, its importance in relation to other existing or potential uses of the water
source, or its effects on the ability of subsequent appropriators to use that source.").
57. For example, Kansas v. Colorado involved a riparian-doctrine state and an appropriation-doctrine state. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907). Kansas recognizes both riparian and appropriation doctrine rights, but it relied mainly on a riparian doctrine claim to the undiminished flow of the Arkansas River. See also Wyoming v.
Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 464 (1922) (discussing Kansas v. Colorado). See generally,
Douglas L. Grant, InterstateAllocation of Rivers Before the United States Supreme Court: The
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-FlintRiver System, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 401 (2004).
58. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 394 (1943).
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'a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of
an international drainage basin' is reinforced by the concept of the
inherent equality of each of the several states. Indeed, equitable ap'
portionment cases often sound like odes to sharing.""
After Colorado v. New Mexico, the court is likely consider factors including a harm-benefit comparison,' the feasibility of means to improve water use efficiency and enhance water supplies,6' and protection
of existing economies dependent on water. The Court may consider
a state's commitment to water conservation and avoidance of waste
relevant, because protection of existing, prior wasteful uses at the expense of newer, more conservation-oriented uses would not be equitable. The court will also consider population and economic demand
relevant. As Tarlock points out:
Recognition of prior uses need not freeze all existing uses. It operates
more to place the burden of water conservation on new users. This is
a difficult but not impossible burden to discharge as the Court's most
recent equitable apportionment case, Colorado v. New Mexico, illus-

trates. And... the burden may be a positive one to society because it
encourages greater state planning and regulatory responsibilities to

promote the efficient use of water.63
Justice Marshall's request of the special master in Colorado v. New
Mexico to make specific findings on remand illustrates the potentially
more expansive concerns of a modern Supreme Court in an equitable
apportionment case." Marshall requested findings regarding:
(1) the existing uses of water [sic] from the Vermejo River, and the
extent to which present levels of use reflect current or historical water
shortages or the failure of existing users to develop their uses diligently; (2) the available supply of water from the Vermejo River, ac-

counting for factors such as variations in streamflow, the needs of cur-

59. Abrams, supra note 8, at 332-33 (citation omitted). The Vermejo River litigation
[Colorado v. New Mexico] suggests that the sharing principle is not prevailing, but that
"reasonable conservation efforts are relevant in calculating a state's entitlement and
that 'the equities supporting the protection of existing economies will usually be compelling,' but that apportionments for wholly future uses, nevertheless, could be obtained." Id. at 334. (quoting Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187 (1982)).
60. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1995); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507
U.S. 584, 593 (1993); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1931); Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 114 (1907).
61. Grant, supra note 57, at 417-18.
62. Colorado, 459 U.S. at 187.
63. Tarlock, supra note 41, at 396. "Although Colorado v. New Mexico is, in terms of
result, a replay of Wyoming v. Colorado, the two opinions suggest that the Court is tightening the standards that a state must meet to retain waters put to historic beneficial
use." Id. at 408.
64. Colorado, 459 U.S. at 189.
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rent users for a continuous supply, the possibilities of equalizing and
enhancing the water supply through water storage and conservation,
and the availability of substitute sources of water to relieve the demand for water from the Vermejo River; (3) the extent to which reasonable conservation measures in both States might eliminate waste
and inefficiency in the use of water from the Vermejo River; (4) the
precise nature of the proposed interim and ultimate use in Colorado
of water from the Vermejo River, and the benefits that would result
from a diversion to Colorado; and (5) the injury, if any, that New
Mexico would likely suffer as a result of any such diversion, taking
into account the extent to which reasonable conservation measures
could offset the diversion. 6
It is reasonable to assume that the Supreme Court sitting today
would perpetuate the tradition of recognizing socially important resource issues when considering equitable apportionment of interstate
waters. Demographics matter. After Colorado v. New Mexico, it is also
reasonable to assume that, balancing the equities and applying the
harm-benefit comparison, the Court may be disposed to reallocate interstate water to achieve a more equitable apportionment of benefits.
III. STATE AREA-OF-ORIGIN STATUTES
(INTERSTATE WATER TRANSFER EMBARGOES)
States may declare a defensive posture with respect to their water
supplies (both intrastate and interstate) through the adoption of a
statute precluding the movement of water from within the state to
serve uses outside the state. Such statutes are typically called "area-oforigin" statutes. Such states seek to place embargoes on interstate water transfers. The primary question that arises with respect to such
statutes is whether the negative implication of the Interstate Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution precludes such embargoes, taking into account the state's objectives premised upon its police power.'
Essential to that question is whether water is a natural resource or a
commodity, an economic or a social good. As Douglas Grant said,
The critical question that arises under the negative commerce clause
is how much state interference with the free flow of commerce between the states is too much. The Supreme Court has used different
approaches over the years in dealing with that question. Generally,
however, the Court in its modern cases has weighed the national in-

65.

Id. at 189-90.

66.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
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terest in the free flow of interstate commerce against whatever inter67
est a state might advance to justify the interference.
8

Douglas."
The primary case in this area is Sporhase v. Nebraska ex ret.
Mr. Sporhase maintained a large, interstate farm with 140 acres in the
State of Colorado and 500 acres in the State of Nebraska.' Sporhase
maintained a groundwater well in Nebraska, along the Colorado/Nebraska state line." Sporhase built a sprinkler system in Colorado and sought a Colorado permit to drill a Colorado well." Colorado turned down Sporhase's application because the aquifer, which
the states share, was already overused." Sporhase thereafter delivered
water from his Nebraska well to the Colorado sprinkler system without
The Neseeking a permit to transfer groundwater from Nebraska.
braska statute prohibited transfer of groundwater to any state that did
not permit transfer to Nebraska.74 The Colorado statute prohibited all
out-of-state groundwater transfers.
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, approached the fundamental
question, whether water is a natural resource within the total control of
the state where the water resides, or whether it is an article in commerce." He divided his analysis into three other questions: whether
ground water is an article of commerce; whether the Nebraska statute
imposed an impermissible burden on interstate commerce; and
whether Congress had granted the states permission to engage in
groundwater regulation that otherwise would be impermissible under
the Commerce Clause. He answered the first question in the affirmative, finding that the state does not own the ground water, notwithstanding its significant regulatory interest, and that there is a federal
interest in water commerce.8 He also answered the second question in
the affirmative, based on the conclusion that the reciprocity clause in
the Nebraska statute failed the Bruce Church balancing test.79 He then
67.

Douglas L. Grant, Commerce ClauseLimits on State Regulation of Interstate Water

Export, 105 WATER RESOURCES UPDATE 10 (Autumn 1996), available at

http://www.ucowr.siu.edu/updates/pdf/V105_A3.pdf.
68. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
69. Id. at 944.
70. Id.
71. Brief for Colorado et al. at 3, as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Sporhase
608568.
v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (No. 81613), 1982 W.VL
72. Id.
73. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 944.
74.

Id. (citing NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978)).

75. See id. at 944 n.2.
76. Id. at 943.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 953-54.
79. Id. at 954, 958; see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)
The Supreme Court established a new balancing test to evaluate the constitutionality of
state legislation affecting interstate commerce:

Issue I

LIMITED APPROACH TO MULTI-STATE MANAGEMENT

answered the third question in the negative, finding that Congress had
not permitted the states to engage in groundwater regulation that otherwise would be impermissible under the Commerce Clause (the negative implications of the Commerce Clause remain in effect unless Congress expressly states an "intent and policy" that state legislation should
be free from attack under the Commerce Clause)." In dissent, Justices
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is
found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities. (citation omitted).
Several cases leading to Sporhase establish the basis for the Supreme Court's
ruling. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529, 535 (1896) (The Court
upheld the constitutionality of a state law that prohibited the interstate transfer of game birds killed within Connecticut. The Court held that wildlife is
the common property of all citizens of a state and, therefore Connecticut
owned game birds "as a trust for the benefit of the people." As owner of the
birds, Connecticut could validly prohibit or condition their capture.); Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1908) (The Court
specifically addressed the power of a state to prevent interstate water transfers. NewJersey had enacted a statute forbidding water transfers out of state
- stating the need to preserve fresh water for the health and prosperity of its
citizens. A water company contracted to divert water from Passaic River in
New Jersey and deliver it to New York City. New Jersey obtained an injunction against the transfer, which was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Justice Holmes held that: "[T]he constitutional power of the State to insist that
its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired by its citizens is not dependent upon any nice estimate of the extent of present use ... and what it has it
may keep and give no one a reason for its will."); West v. Kan. Natural Gas
Co., 221 U.S. 229, 258 (1911) (Oklahoma adopted a law prohibiting the interstate sale of gas produced within Oklahoma. The Court limited its decision in Hudson County Water Co., holding that only the initial possession of
natural resources may be restricted for conservation purposes under a state's
police power. Once the resource is in private hands, prohibitions on transfer
must be evaluated under the Commerce Clause. The Court must decide
whether the law constitutes an undue burden on interstate commerce.);
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (State regulation of natural
resources is not exempt from Commerce Clause scrutiny. Oklahoma required licenses for commercial enterprises that seine, transport or sell minnows, and by another statute precluded shipment of minnows for sale in another state. The Supreme Court (Brennan) repudiated Geer v. Connecticut, rejecting the theory of state ownership of natural resources, finding "[t]he fiction of state ownership may no longer be used to force those outside the State
to bear the full costs of 'conserving' . . . when equally effective nondiscriminatory conservation measures are available.").
80.
See A. Dan Tarlock, We Are All Water Lawyers Now: Water Law's PotentialBut Limited Impact on Urban Growth Management, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL
LAND USE? 92 (Craig Anthony Arnold ed., 2005) ("A few states with serious overdrafts
have imposed substantial limitations on new groundwater use, but the dormant Commerce Clause may prevent the use of these regimes to limit urban growth. Sporhase v.
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Rehnquist and O'Connor argued that water is not an article in corn81

merce.

In 1982, when the Supreme Court heard the Sporhase case, seventeen states and the District of Columbia had statutes limiting out-ofstate transfers of water, either partially or completely: (1) absolute
prohibition - Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico; (2) discretionary
approval power in state legislature or administrative officer - Arizona,
Montana, Wyoming, Oregon, Oklahoma, Nebraska; (3) reciprocity Kansas, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Nebraska; and (4) no prohibition - California, North Dakota, Texas. 2 At present, most western
states have export statutes, fashioned primarily to satisfy the Sporhase
test.8 ' Each statute contains means by which the exporting state can
determine, as a prerequisite to permitting the interstate transfer,
whether a state can serve its intrastate water needs while making the
transfer. 4
The Sporhasecase raises the fundamental question of whether water
is an economic good, 5 the value of which should be given freedom to
Nebraska ex rel Douglas holds that state water laws are subject to the dormant Commerce
Clause because water is an article of commerce. Sporhase constrains state restrictions
on interstate transfers and its impact on intrastate transfers is largely untested.") (citations omitted). See also Richard S. Harnsberger, Josephine R. Potuto & Norman W.
Thorson, Interstate Transfers of Water: State Options after Sporhase, 70 NEB. L. REv. 754, 759
(1991), characterizing the Supreme Court's opinion in Sporhase as an "overview of governing federal constitutional constraints on state water law and policy." The article
explores ways that a state may act consistent with those federal constraints and describes the potential benefits and burdens of particular policy options. The article
contends that the holding in Sporhase is narrow - addressing only reciprocity, that the
holding applies both to ground water and surface water, that no constitutional obstacles prevent Congress from exercising exclusive control over ground water management, and that the Bruce Church test allows a state to prefer its own citizens in times of
severe water shortage, assuming that the state establishes a close ends-means relationship.
81. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 961 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
82. Harnsberger,supra note 80, at 817.
83. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-291 to 45-294 (2008); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-81101 to 37-81-104 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-401 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a726, 82a-1502 to 82a-1504 (2006); MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 85-2-311, 85-2-316 (2008); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 46-613.01 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 533.515 to 533.524 (LexisNexis
2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1 (West 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 82-LB (2008); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 537.810 to 537.870 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 46-1-13 (2008); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 73-3a-108 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.300 (LexisNexis 2008);
Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-115 (2008).
84. In addition to the statutes listed supra note 83, for a general discussion, see City
of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D. N.M. 1984); City of El Paso v. Reynolds,
563 F. Supp. 379 (D. N.M. 1983).
85. See CARL J. BAUER, SIREN SONG: CHILEAN WATER LAW AS A MODEL FOR
INTERNATIONAL REFORM 10 (Resources for the Future, 2004). The Dublin Principles,
adopted by the International Conference on Water and Environment, Dublin, 1992 - a
precursor event to the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 1992 - recognized among
other things that "[wlater has an economic value in all its competing uses and should
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find its greatest utility." Water is essential to human sustenance, public
health, and food production. It works and produces energy. Its aesthetic and recreational value is now more greatly recognized. Water's
role in society was not, obviously, a matter upon which the Supreme
Court's members could agree in 198287 and probably is not a matter
upon which its current members could now agree.
The question whether states technically "own" water resources or
merely have constitutionally reserved rights to regulate them is essentially academic. There is a clear state interest in ground water preservation and use-an interest that states will need to utilize collectively in
the case of interstate groundwater bodies. In Sporhase, the Court could
not use its equitable apportionment thinking, balancing harms and
benefits so as to apportion the resource, because the parties were not
states.88 Reliance on the Commerce Clause rationale was therefore required."9 But, in the future, were state export statutes evaluated on the
equitable apportionment rationale - that is, considering equity of
benefit from the interstate water system, rather than the balance of
commercial integration versus protection of a state's protection of the
welfare of its citizens - those statutes might not stand.

be recognized as an economic good." Bauer observes: "The strongest market advocates
argue that managing water as an economic good means treating water as a fully private
and tradable commodity, subject to the rules and forces of the free market; from this
perspective, the economic value of water is the same as its market price." Id. Bauer also
notes:
"[t]
he extreme opposing viewpoint considers access to water as a basic human
right and sees market forces and prices as unacceptable or irrelevant. An intermediate position is that water should be recognized as a scarce resource,
which means that the available supplies are insufficient to satisfy all demands
and that trade-offs are therefore necessary in allocating water to different
uses. These trade-offs, however, need not be made via private or unregulated
markets."
86. Bauer explores the value of water as an "economic good" in an excellent comparative study of the several water codes adopted in Chile during the Twentieth Century. Bauer compares three generations of Chilean water law: Chile's first water code
(1951); Chile's 1967 Amendment to its 1925 Constitution and consequent Agrarian
and Water Reform laws; and Chile's third Water Code (1981). The three laws illustrate the normal Western U.S. states' type regulated-resource approach, a revolutionary
distribution-of-wealth type approach, and a pure economic-good approach to water
rights ownership and management. Bauer concludes that the first is best, albeit constantly in tension between social and economic objectives. See BAUER, supra note 85.
See also, Matt Berkowitz, Bottling the Water Bottlers: A Critique of Pennsylvania Groundwater
Law, 22 TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 235 (2004) (discussing the special problem of exportation of groundwater as an economic good).
87. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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IV. INTERSTATE GROUND WATER: A COMPLEX RESOURCE
The geologic history of the present North American continent includes an era of the presence of great surface water bodies which are
now overlain by newer geologic materials. These geologic materials sediments" or volcanic basalts, tuffs or ice- and water-relocated granitics9' - have captured now-deep water bodies that are large in area and
extend under modern U.S. political boundaries." Likewise, more surfacial, alluvial ground water, resulting from the contribution of modernera (even current annual) precipitation through rain and snow, lies
and moves in the porous and transmissive sands, gravels, tills and loams
of the modern geologic surface, often under the hydrologic influence
of surface water rivers. Like the larger deep connate or fossil aquifers,
these higher elevation aquifers also do not respect U.S. political
boundaries. Unlike interstate surface water systems, there has been
little to no effort in defining a legal approach to the problem of apportioning underground hydrologic systems between the political subdivisions of the American political system - namely, the states." According
to the Cambridge Encyclopedia of Earth Sciences:
The world water cycle constitutes a transfer of water between reservoirs. The largest store of water is the oceans which contain 97.6 per
cent of all water. Of the remainder, the atmosphere contains, at any
one time, around 0.035 percent as vapor. On the land at the present
day three-quarters of all non-ocean water occurs as ice in glaciers and
ice caps, and almost a quarter consists of groundwater, stored in the
voids of rocks beneath the surface. Moisture in the soil accounts for
0.06 percent while lakes and rivers contain only 0.33 percent of all
non-ocean water. Nevertheless it is in the lakes and rivers that water is
actually moving fastest, for it is through them that almost the entire
terrestrial water cycle is funneled back to the sea. The relative rapidity of flow processes in the various stores may be seen by comparing
their mean residence times, found by dividing their volume by their
net throughput. The water cycle is the most vigorous at the Earth's
surface, with residence times all much less than one year, whereas

90. "Connate water" is water that was entrapped within sediments when they were
deposited. Such water typically does not ultimately supply surface flow. Connate water
is usually very deep and has not traditionally been considered as available as a contribution to available groundwater supply.
91. "Fossil water" is water that is very deep, often found in aquifers within bedrock
material.
92. See Figure 1, Principle Aquifers of the United States
93. In 1995, "nearly 60 percent of all groundwater used in the United States is
pumped in just eight states - in the order of volume pumped within the state, California, Texas, Nebraska, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Arizona and Idaho." DELLAPENNA,
supra note 1, at 18-2 (citing U.S.GS. Circular no. 1200 (1998)). Groundwater withdrawal then was just under 20 percent of the total amount of water withdrawn in the
United States. Id.
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residence times in groundwaters are from a few years to thousands of
years, averaging at a few hundred. The oceans and glaciers have residence times of thousands of years.9 4
Generally speaking, groundwater bodies are heterogeneous. 9' They
may be composed of varying or intersticed geologic matter." Waters
within those geologic masses move pursuant to hydraulic principles,
albeit slowly compared to surface waters. 7
The movement of water within an aquifer is downhill hydraulically
from where the water level in the aquifer is high to where the level is
lower, but pressure and friction cause it to move slowly, without the
turbulence marking surface flows.
...The velocity with which groundwater moves in any given direction
will be determined by permeability, hydraulic conductivity, porosity,
and the hydraulic gradient. 8
One aquifer may be hydraulically connected to another, either vertically or horizontally, with the pace of ground water affected by the
geologic composition of intervening masses.
[F] ormations with the greatest head potential will lose water to those
with lesser head potential. Natural gradients also may allow water to
migrate from one formation to another in inter-aquifer exchange.
Intervening aquitards slow the movement relative to some direct exchanges, but they do not stop it. 9
In some instances, there is a hydrologic connection between
ground water and surface water, 00 one being "tributary''' to the other.
94.

THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH SCIENCES 291 (David G. Smith ed.,

Cambridge Univ. Press 1981).
95. "While the movement of water through homogeneous aquifers is understood,
movement through non-homogeneous aquifers is not understood. The precise constitution, location, and extent of non-homogeneous aquifers are expensive and timeconsuming to determine, if they can be determined at all." DELLAPENNA, supra note 1,
at 18-13.
96. Id. at 18-9.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 18-8. Note that the "downhill" to which Dellapenna refers may be up, i.e.,
toward the earth's surface. Ground water flows from areas of high pressure to areas of
low pressure. This is called the "hydraulic gradient." The terms "permeability" and
"hydraulic conductivity" are sometimes used interchangeably.
99. Id. at 18-11. "Porosity is the fraction of a rock's bulk volume which is made up
of voids. In general, clastic rocks are porous, especially if poorly cemented, while crystalline rocks have low porosity. Porosity is usually greatly decreased by diagenesis of
sedimentary rocks but is increased by weathering." Smith, supra note 94, at 293.
100. See, e.g., D.E. Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 2001);
In re General Adjudication of All Rights To Use Water In Gila River System And
Source, 9 P.3d 1069, 1073-74, 1083 (Ariz. 2000) (holding "subflow" can be regulated as
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The hydraulic gradient or slope of the water in confined or unconfined aquifers slowly but massively provides volume to surface streams,
in some seasons all of a stream's flow. Permeability as well as hydraulic gradient plays a significant role in this process. All groundwater in
motion, and other than connate water "entrapped within sediments
12

when they are deposited," ultimately will supply some stream.

0

Where ground waters supply streams, they are sometimes called

"gaining streams." ' 3 Streams that supply ground waters are called "losing streams" or "losing reaches."'' 4 Ground water can be recharged
from the unsaturated zone from precipitation, from losing streams or
other surface waters, or from other ground water in adjacent aquifers.
When the upper boundary of the groundwater body in an aquifer is
the water table, the aquifer is said to be unconfined. The ground water is fed by recharge from the unsaturated zone. In some cases an
aquifer is overlain by an aquiclude and the water in it is under greater
than atmospheric pressure. The aquifer is then confined. Water will
rise up a borehole drilled into it until it reaches a level that defines
the hydraulic head in the aquifer."°
During floods or other occasions of supersaturation, surface water can
have a higher potential than groundwater, thus reversing the normal

relationship and directly charging the aquifer, wiping out the baffling
power of the unsaturated zone. "6

surface water although it is not flowing at the surface and no unconstitutional taking
occurs from its regulation); Chatfield E. Well Co. v. Chatfield E. Prop. Owners Ass'n,
956 P.2d 1260, 1267-68 (Colo. 1998); Baumler v. Town of Newstead, 668 N.Y.S.2d 814
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Rettkowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 233-34 (Wash.
1993).
101. SeeJ. David Aiken, The Western Common Law of Tributary Groundwater:Implications
for Nebraska, 83 NEB. L. REv. 541, 542 (2004); RobertJerome Glennon & Thomas Maddock, III, The Concept of Capture: The Hydrology and Law of Stream/Aquifer Interaction, 43
RocI MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22-1, 22-8 (1997); Robert Jerome Glennon & Thomas Maddock, III, In Search of Subflow: Arizona's Futile Effort to Separate Groundwaterfrom Surface
Water, 36 ARIz. L. REv. 567 (1994).
102.

DELLAPENNA, supra note 1, at 18-11 (citation omitted).

103. See Groundwater Glossary: The Groundwater Foundation,
http://www.groundwater.org/gi/gwglossary.html#G ("Gaining stream: A stream in
which groundwater discharges contribute significantly to the streamflow volume. The
same stream could be both a gaining stream and a losing stream, depending on the
conditions.").
104. Id. Losing reaches sometimes occur as a result of significant groundwater
pumping in the vicinity of an otherwise gaining stream.
105. Smith, supra note 94, at 293.
106.

DELLAPENNA, supra note 1, at 18-12.

1D APPROACH TO MULTI-STATE MANAGEMENT

ttes Geological Survey has mapped principal aquifers
:es (Figure 1). 07' The map reveals that the nation's
do not respect state boundaries.

ipal Aquifers of the United States
posited four case models to illustrate the transarising from shared groundwater resources' interacwater.' 8 Although the four cases anticipate applicattional boundary context, they are no less relevant in
nestic interstate groundwater basins. Eckstein refined
I Barberis' models when describing his six model

Lquifers of the 48 Conterminous United States, Hawaii, Puerto
irgin Islands, http://nationalatlas.gov/mld/aquifrp.html (last
is, The Development of InternationalLaw of Transboundary Groundwa-
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V. ATTRIBUTES OF GROUNDWATER RIGHTS UNDER VARIOUS
STATES' LAWS: CONFLICT OR INTEGRATION?
Constructive conversation about apportionment or management of
interstate groundwater resources will be more difficult where conflict
exists between the governmental or proprietary law related to ground
water of two or more states. Which state's law should apply? With surface water, the general appropriative/riparian distinction, applicable
generally on a west/east axis, suggests that at least the same general
jurisprudence will prevail throughout a region of states where an interstate water body may lie or flow. However, with ground water, adjacent
states' law is more likely to vary.
Dellapenna notes "the states have not opted for a single legal rule
to regulate groundwater." ' Glennon posits that "groundwater law has
more variety between and among western states than does surface water law."' Although this is perhaps an apt generalization, an analysis
of western states' laws regarding shared groundwater bodies suggests
that those laws may, in fact, be more similar than different in particular
cases.
Definition of the attributes of a water right, whether a right to surface or ground water, depends upon the origin of the right, whether
from state statute or common law, federal statute, or contract. Dellapenna describes five potential legal doctrines for ground water in the
sected by an international border and hydraulically linked to a river that is also intersected by the same international border; (3) an unconfined aquifer that flows across an
international border and that is linked hydraulically to a river flowing completely
within one state's territory; (4) an unconfined aquifer that is completely within the
territory of one state but that is linked hydraulically to a river that flows across an international border (the aquifer is always located in the downstream state.); (5) a confined aquifer, unconnected hydraulically with any surface water body, with a zone of
recharge (perhaps in an unconfined portion of the aquifer) that traverses an international border or that is located completely in another state; and (6) an aquifer unrelated to any other body of water (e.g., a stream or lake) that is disconnected from the
hydrologic cycle.
In the last model case, the aquifer does not recharge, contains non-renewable ground
water, and a state could never sustainably utilize it. Such aquifers contain ancient waters and may be confined or unconfined as well as fossil or connate. If the aquifer is
unconfined, a lack of recharge generally implies that it is located in an arid zone where
annual precipitation is inconsequentially small. Moreover, as there is neither a distinct
recharge or discharge zone, the ground water table in this type of aquifer is horizontal
and the water is stagnant with little or no perceptible flow. The transboundary consequences associated with aquifers that do not recharge are almost exclusively a function
of pumping the aquifer in one or more of the riparian states. When a state commences production of ground water from a water well penetrating such an aquifer, the
state will generate an ever-expanding cone of depression that will eventually encroach
in the subsurface across the international border.
110. DELLAPENNA, supranote 1, at §18.06.
111. Jedidiah Brewer et al., Transferring Water in the American West: 1987-2005, 40 U.
MIcH.J.L. REroRM 1021, 1027 (2006) (citation omitted).
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United States, with variations and modifications, excluding rights
based on prescriptive use and the federally-created rights: (1) the absolute dominion rule; (2) the reasonable use rule; (3) the correlative
rights rule; (4)2 the regulated riparian system; and (5) the appropriative
rights system."

Under the absolute dominion rule, a landowner may withdraw
ground water from an aquifer under his land for any purpose and use,
be it on or off the land. "3 Under the reasonable use rule, one may use
ground water reasonably upon the land from beneath which it was
withdrawn, but cannot be spread to use on other land, thus limiting
the property rights in the aquifer to the overlying owners. 4 The reasonable use rule does not require the institution of an administrative
process."' Under the correlative rights rule, landowners hold proportionate proprietary shares in the aquifer, depending upon their proportionate share of the overlying property."6 Like the reasonable use
rule, the correlative rights rule does not require the institution of an
administrative process. Under a regulated riparian system, permits to
withdraw water for reasonable use must be obtained from a state permitting entity."7 Under an appropriative rights system, rights may have
been established prior to enactment of permitting statutes, by acclaim
and diversion." 8 Modernly, anyone can establish appropriative rights

112. DELLAPENNA, supra note 1, at 19-18.
113. Id. at 19-20. The absolute dominion rule is also referred to as the "English
Rule," as that is its origin. First stated in Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex.
Cham. 1843), the rules provides that, absent malice or willful waste, a landowner has
the right to take all the groundwater he can capture from under his land, and do with
it as he pleases, and will not be liable to neighboring landowners even if in doing so he
deprives his neighbor of the use of the water. The English Rule is actually a rule of tort
law, rather than a rule of property law. The absolute dominion rule is also called the
"rule of capture" as it permits a landowner to capture the ground water beneath the
land without limitation other than through the protection of other landowners
through tort law.
114. Id. at 22-19 to 22-21. The reasonable use rule is also sometimes referred to as
the "American Rule," distinguishing it from the "English Rule." Id. at 22-12. Originally
applicable to surface water, eastern American states adopting the reasonable use rule
have extended it to ground water. With respect to surface water, the reasonable use
rule provides that a landowner is "entitled to take only [those actions] as are reasonable, in light of all the circumstances of relative advantage to the actor and the disadvantage to the adjoining land6wners, as well as social utility." Ridge Line, Inc. v.
United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Page Motor Co. v. Baker,
438 A.2d 739, 741 (Conn. 1980). See also Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 577
(N.H. 1862).
115. See Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50
ARIZ. L. REv. 445, 472-74 (2008).
116. DELLAPENNA, supra note 1, at 21-12 to 21-3.
117. Id. at 23-23.
118. Smith, supra note 94, at 467.
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to withdraw water, notwithstanding their ownership of land, so long as
they obtain a state permit."9
A survey of state statutes regulating groundwater rights reveals that
there is a relatively consistent body of law throughout the states regarding groundwater rights, notwithstanding the commonly held view that
the states' laws are diverse (Table 1).
Table 1120
State

Groundwater Legal

Statutory References

System

Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

Statutory
References

System

Regulated
Riparian

ALA. CODE §§ 9-

Regulated
Riparian

ALA. CODE §§

10B-1 to -30

Appropriat-

ALASKA STAT. §

Appropri-

ALASKA STAT.

ive Rights

46.15.040

ative
Rights

§§ 46.15.010
to- .270

Absolute
Dominion

ARiz. REV. STAT.
§ 45-103121

Appropriative

ARIZ. REv.
STAT. § 45-

Rights
System

103

Rule generally; Regulated Reasonable Use
System in
Active Management
Areas

119.
120.

Surface
Water

9-1OB-I to -30

DELLAPENNA, supra note 1, at 19-4.
ALYSON GouLD, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FIFTY STATE

(2009), http://www.ncsl.org/.
121.
Willardson, Tony, "Ground Water Management in the West," Western States'
Water Council (2004), unpublished manuscript, in possession of author. Brewer, et
al., supra note 111.
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State

Arkansas

California"'

LIMITED APPROACH TO MULTI-STATE MANAGEMENT

Groundwater Legal
System
Regulated
Riparian

Reasonable
123
use.
"Overlying
Rights"correlative.
124

Nonoverlying users
("appropriators")
can pump
surplus
water for
export from
the basin or
for nonoverlying uses.
Where no
surplus,
right of the
appropriator must
yield to
overlying
owner.

Statutory References
ARK. CODE §§ 1522-201 to 1313

No state ground
water management in Califor• 125
nia.

Surface
Water
System
Regulated
Riparian

Statutory
References

Regulated
Riparian
paramount.
Appropriative
Rights
System
(includes
surface
water and
"subterra-

CAL. CONST.

ARK. CODE §§
15-22-205 to 223

ART. 10, §2;
CAL. WATER
CODE, § 1200

nean
streams
flowing
through
known
and definite channels")

122. See David RE. Aladjem, California's Other "DualSystem:" CoordinatedManagement
of Groundwater and Surface Water, 49 RoCmY MTN. MIN. L. INST. §§ 7C.01-7 7C.03
(2003).
123. CAL. CONST. art. 10, § 2.
124. See City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 740 (1998)
(stating that each owner "has a common right to take all that he can beneficially use
on his land if the quantity is sufficient; if the quantity is insufficient, each is limited to
his proportionate fair share of the total amount available based on his reasonable
need."). See also Anne J. Schneider, Evolving Federalism in Water Law and Policy, at the
A.B.A. Section of Environmental, Energy, and Resources 17th Annual Water Law Conference (1999).
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State

Groundwater Legal
System

Statutory References

Surface
Water
System

Statutory
References

Colorado 126

Appropriat-

COLO. REV. STAT.

Appropri-

ive Rights
System
(ground
water not
tributary to
surface

§ 37-82-101

ative

CoLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-82-

Rights
System
(includes
tributary
ground

1

water)
Regulated
Riparian

101

Connecticut

water). 2
Regulated
Riparian

Delaware

Regulated

DEL. CODE ANN

Regulated

DEL. CODE

Riparian

tit. 7, § 60, Environmental Control (scattered

Riparian

ANN. tit. 7, §§
6003 to 6013

FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§

CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 22a-365

365 to -380

to -378

Florida

CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 22a-

Regulated

sections)
FLA. STAT. ANN.

Regulated

Riparian

§§ 373.013 -. 71

Riparian

Regulated

GA. CODE ANN.

Regulated

Riparian

§§ 12-5-1 to -193

Riparian

373.403 -. 468
Georgia

GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 12-5-

20 to -53
Hawaii

Regulated

Riparian
Idaho

Appropriative Rights
System 12 8

HAw. REv. STAT.
§§ 174C-1 to -68

Regulated
Riparian

IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 42-202

Appropriative
Rights

HAw. REv.
STAT. §§
174C-1 to -95
IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 42-202

System

125.

See CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (2008).

See also SCOTT S. SLATER, CALIFORNIA

(2007) (discussing state groundwater issues in California).
126. See COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6. See also D. Monte Pascoe, Plans and Studies:
The Recent Quest for Utopia in the Utilization of Colorado's Water Resources, 55 U. COLO. L.
REV. 391, 395-5, 414 (1984); James J. Petrock, Use of Colorado Water Rights In Secured
Transactions 18 COLO. LAW. 2307, 2309 (1989); Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property
Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 268 (1990); Note, Nontributary, Nondesignated Ground Water: The Huston Decision, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 135, 136
(1984); Note, Principles & Law of Colorado's Nontributary Ground Water, 62 DEN. U. L.
REv. 809, 811 (1985).
127. See Ramsey L. Kropf, Colorado Groundwater Law: Colorado's System-Integration (or
Not?) of Groundwater and Surface Water, 49 ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. §§ 7B.01, 7B.02
(2003); Hal D. Simpson, Conjunctive Use of Surface and Ground Water in the Arkansas River
Basin, Colorado, at the A.B.A. Section of Environmental, Energy, and Resources 15th
Annual Water Law Conference (1997).
128. See Karl J.Dreher, Groundwater and Conjunctive Use in Drought Management, the
Crisis on the Eastern Snake River Plain, at the A.B.A. Section of Environmental, Energy,
and Resources 23rd Annual Water Law Conference (2005).
WATER LAw AND POLICY § 11
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State

Illinois

Indiana

Groundwater Legal
System
Regulated
Riparian

Statutory References
525 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 45/1 45/7

Surface
Water
System
Regulated
Riparian

Statutory
References
615 ILL.
COMP. STAT.

50/1
§§
14-25-1 to -2, -

Regulated

IND. CODE §§ 14-

Regulated

Riparian

25-1-1 to 15-13

Riparian

Regulated

IOWA CODE §

Regulated

IOWA CODE

Riparian

455B.261 - .281

Riparian

455B.261 279

Appropriative Rights
System

KAN. STAT. ANN.

Appropri-

§§ 82a-705, 82a 1021 to -1039

ative
Rights
System
Regulated

KAN. STAT.
ANN. §82a-

IND. Code

5
Iowa

Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Regulated

Ky.

Riparian

ANN. §§ 151.100

Regulated
Riparian

Maine

Regulated
Riparian

REV. STAT.

Regulated
Riparian

Michigan

Regulated
Riparian

Riparian

151.100 to .990
None

ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 38 §§

Regulated
Riparian

ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit.

MD. CODE ANN.,
EMNVR. §§ 5-201

MASS. GEN. LAws

Regulated

ch. 21 §§ 8 to
25A
MICH. COMP.

Riparian

LAWS §§

5, §3331-8
Regulated
Riparian

MINN. STAT. §§
103A.001 -

Regulated
Riparian

Regulated

MISS. CODE ANN.

Riparian

§§ 51-3-1 to -55

1302
MASS. GEN.

Regulated

LAws ch. 21G,
§§ 1-19
MICH. COMP.

Riparian

LAWS §§

324.32101Regulated
Riparian

1031.715
Mississippi

MD. CODE
ANN., ENVIR.

§§ 5-201 to-

.30113
Regulated
Riparian

REV. STAT.

to -.210;
§151.990
LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 30:2072
to -2089

324.30101Minnesota

KY.

ANN. §§

to -1302
Massachusetts

705

Riparian

401 to - 404
Maryland

§§

3420
MINN. STAT.
§§ 103A.001 -

103G.801
Regulated

Riparian
1_

_1

MIss. CODE
ANN. §§ 51-3to-55
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Surface
Water
System
Regulated
Riparian

Statutory
References

Groundwater Legal
System
Regulated
Riparian

Statutory References

Montana

Appropriative Rights
System' 9

MONT. CODE
ANN. §§85-2-101
to -907

Appropriative
Rights
System

Nebraska

Correlative
Rights' 0
Reasonable
Use, managed by
Natural
Resource
Districts
Appropriative Rights
System

NEB. REV. STAT.
§§46-635 to -642
NEB. REV. STAT.
§§46-700 to -740
No state management of
ground water

Appropriative
Rights
System

NEB. REV.
STAT. §46226

Appropriative
Rights
System

NEv. REv.
STAT.
§§532.010
534.360

Riparian

None
N.J. STAT.ANN. §§
58:1A-1 to-17
N.M. STAT. §§
72-5-1 to -39

State

Missouri

Mo. ANN. STAT. §
640.400 to -.435

New Hampshire

Regulated
Riparian

NEv. REv. STAT.
§§532.010 534.360. State
management of
ground and
surface water is
integrated.
N.H. REv. STAT.
§ 482:1 to -:93

NewJersey

Regulated
Riparian

N.J. STAT.- ANN. §
58:1A-1 to -58:26

Regulated
Riparian

New Mexico

Appropriative Rights
System

N.M. STAT. §§ 7212-1 to -28

Appropriative
Rights
System

New York

Regulated
Riparian

N.Y. ENvTL.
CONSERV. LAW

Regulated
Riparian

Nevada

§15-0101 to -

Regulated
Riparian

N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 143215.11 to-.22B

-

N.Y. ENVrL.
CONSERV. LAW
§15-0101 to 2901

3111

North Carolina

Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§
640.400 to .435
MONT. CODE
ANN. §§85-2101 to -907

Regulated
Riparian

N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§
143-215.11 to
-.22L

129. See Laura S. Ziemer, Eloise Kendy & John Wilson, Ground Water Management in
Montana: On the Road from Beleaguered Law to Science-Based Policy, 27 PUB. LAND &
RESOURCES L. REV. 75, 79 (2006).

130.

Willardson, supra note 121.
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State

Groundwater Legal
System
Appropriative Rights
System

Statutory References

Ohio

Regulated
Riparian

Oklahoma

Surface
Water
System
Appropriative
Rights
System

Statutory
References

OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. §1521.16

Regulated
Riparian

OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§
1521.01 to .99

Appropriative Rights
System

OKLA. STAT. tit.
82 § 1020.7

OKLA. STAT.
tit. 82 § 105.9

Oregon

Appropriative Rights
System

OR. REV. STAT. §
537.120

Appropriative
Rights
System
Appropriative
Rights

Pennsylvania

Regulated
Riparian

Regulated
Riparian

Rhode Island

Regulated
Riparian

62 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 631
to 641
R.I. GEN. LAws §
46.15.7-1

South Carolina

Regulated
Riparian

Regulated
Riparian

South Dakota

Appropriative Rights
System 3'

S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 49-1-10 to 495-150
S.D. CODIFIED §
46-6-3

Tennessee

Regulated
Riparian

Texas

Absolute
Dominion

North Dakota

N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 61-04-02

N.D. CENT.
CODE § 61-0402

OR. REv.
STAT.§
537.120

System

Regulated
Riparian

27 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§
3101-3136
R.I. GEN.
LAws §§
46.15.7-1 to-3

TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 69-1-101 to 117
TEXAS WATER
CODE ANN. § 36002

Rule 132
Utah

Appropriative Rights
System

UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 73-3-1

Vermont

Regulated
Riparian

VT. STAT. ANN.
Tit. 10 § 1410

I-_

Appropriative
Rights
System
Regulated
Riparian

I

Appropriative
Rights
System
Appropriative
Rights
System
Riparian
I

S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 49-410-80
S.D. CODIFIED
§ 46-5-10

TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 69-7301to-309
TEXAS WATER
CODE ANN. §
22.022
UTAH CODE
ANN. § 73-3-1

VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10 §
, 1031

131.
"South Dakota water law is a mix of Prior Appropriation and Riparian Doctrines running from the West to East." Willardson, supra note 121, (quoting Garland
Erbele, South Dakota State Engineer).
132.
See Dylan 0. Drummond, Lynn Ray Sherman & Edmond R. McCarthy Jr., The
Rule of Capture in Texas-Still So Misunderstood After All These Years, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV.

1,13-15 (2004).

Volume 12

WATER LAW REVIEW
State

Virginia

Washington

Groundwa-

Statutory Refer-

Surface

Statutory

ter Legal
System

ences

Water
System

References

Regulated

VA. CODE ANN. §

Regulated

VA.

Riparian

62.1-263

Riparian

Appropriative Rights

WASH. REV. CODE
§ 90.03.010

Appropriative

90.03.010

CODE

ANN. § 62.11 44.2 to -.34:28
WASH. REV.
CODE §

West Virginia

Regulated
Riparian

W. VA. CODE ANN
§ 22-12-1 to -14

Rights
System
(Regulated Riparian are
also recognized)
Regulated
Riparian

Wisconsin

Regulated
Riparian

Wisc. STAT. ANN.
§281.11 to .37

Regulated
Riparian

Wis. STAT. §
30.18

Wyoming

Appropriative Rights

Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§41-3-905, 906

Appropriative

WYO. STAT.
ANN. §41-3-

System

Rights

System
_____________
_________

_____________

System

W. VA. CODE
ANN § 22-26-1
to -9

101
_______

With respect to governmental law, i.e., the extent, nature and
means of governmental involvement in water rights, adjacent states
may differ constitutionally concerning the public/private character of
the ground water resource. One state's statutes may provide for more,
or less, regulative involvement in the management of the resource than
others. Comparing Figure 1 (USGS's map of principal aquifers) with
Table 1, it appears that most adjacent states sharing principal aquifers
have relatively similar groundwater legal regimes. There are exceptions, for example:
California/Nevada, Arizona/New Mexico,
and
possibly
OreTexas/New
Mexico,
Texas/Oklahoma
gon/Washington. Where states authorize groundwater use permitting,
the extent, nature, and even the process of regulation may differ. The
concept of comity, which is the deference and respect states show for
each other's laws, generally resolves conflicts in the exercise of sovereignty, particularly if being applied within the geographic limits of that
state's jurisdiction. " In natural resource matters, comity is the frequent and common basis under which adjacent states assist each other
with fighting forest fires, protecting or managing migrating game, or
addressing water pollution in interstate streams.'

133.
Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485, 486 (1911).
134. The latter, of course, is more modernly actuated by federal statutory requirements under the Clean Water Act, rather than through simple comity. Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317-18 (1981).
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With respect to the proprietary law of water, conflict is not between
sovereign rights, but rather between private rights, i.e., a dispute between competing claimants premising their claims on adjacent states'
differing legal principles of ownership. In the case of interstate surface
water, the U.S. Supreme Court's historic decision in Wyoming v. Colorado suggests that where the legal regimes for development of the water
right are the same, the legal principles of both are applicable, i.e., defWhere true conflict is
erence to prior rights in the adjacent state.
joined, for example, in a conflict between a permitted ground water
retrieval state and an Absolute Dominion Rule state,' 6 some principles
of conflict of law resolution may need to be applied.'37
Whether the guiding paradigm of a state's groundwater law differs
from its neighbors' is only part of the context within which interstate
ground water apportionments may be accomplished. Their respective
laws may differ as it relates to various particular issues. For example,
there is potential for a conflict of law where there is a hydrologic connection between ground and surface water."3' The case law in western
states has not developed to the same extent regarding how the laws of
those waters interact. Where ground-surface water connectivity exists,
surface water law may control all or some of the groundwater rights,

defining their attributes differently than if there was no hydrologic
connection. 9 Holders of ground or surface water rights may have
rights vis-;I-vis each other, notwithstanding state regulatory interests

135. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 471 (1922).
136. For example, New Mexico and Texas.
137. Conflict of law resolution principles include: (1) a provision in the law of the
choice of law state that permits the court to use the lexfori, i.e. law of the forum state;
(2) the "significant contacts test," which evaluates the contacts between the states and
each party to the case, and applies the law of the state that has the most significant
contacts with the litigation as a whole; (3) the "seat of the relationship test," which
examines the relationship between the parties to the lawsuit, and applies the law of the
state in which the relationship between the parties was most significant; (4) the
"balance of interests test," which examines the interests of the states themselves, and
the original purpose for the laws in question. Other alternatives include the
"comparative impairment test," which examines which state's policies would suffer
more if their law was not applied, or the "better rule test," which seeks to apply the
empirically-better law, as between the competing states. However, state judicial
application of choice of law rules is subject to the limitations of the U.S. Constitution's
Full Faith and Credit Clause and Fourteenth Amendment. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (both the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment are satisfied so long as there are sufficient aggregate contacts between the
forum and the event giving rise to the cause of action).
138. See supratext accompanying note 100.
139. DELLAPENNA, supra note 139, at 18-4. "[In the early twentieth century, t]he idea
that all water was tributary to some stream (or that streams were tributary to groundwater), if followed rigorously to its logical conclusion, would have made chaos of existing
legal regimes."
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over either. "' Some recent decisions from western states have begun to
recognize the legal implications of interconnected surface and
groundwater systems.' Storage of surface water underground in some
states also raises additional questions.'42 Various states' recognition of
the significance of hydrologic connectivity makes it likely that there
will be differing outcomes on this matter in adjacent states.
Conflict of law may exist regarding the degree to which a public interest encumbers a state-based water right. Depending on the state, a
water right may be regarded as a pure property interest. More commonly, however, the right is regarded as infused with some sort of reserved public aspect. The declaration by some states that water is always ultimately owned by the state or "the public" infuses the right with
an encumbrance of responsibility to use water wisely even after a citizen establishes a valid right to use the water. A constitutional declaration of public or state ownership limits the legislative or administrative
transfer of public rights to individual property owners.' 0 A judiciallydeveloped "public trust doctrine"'4 or a "public interest" component
lodged within a state's permitting statute' 5 may do the same. Where a
140. See David J. Aiken, Hydrologically-Connected Ground Water, Section 858, and the
Spear T. Ranch Decision, 84 NEB. L. REV. 962, 964 (2006) (discussing the Nebraska Supreme Court's adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 858 (2005), to resolve
conflicts between surface water and groundwater rights).
141. DELLAPENNA, supra note 1, at 18-29 (citing Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1
(2001); City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000); State ex rel
Johnny Appleseed Metro. Park Dist. v. City of Delphos, 750 N.E.2d 1158 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2001); Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 5 P.3d 1206 (Utah 2000);
Hubbard v. State, 936 P.2d 27 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)). See also Robert Glennon, Pinching Straws: Reforming Groundwater and Surface Water Law to Protect the Environment, 49
ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 7A-1, 7A-4 (2003).

142.

PeterJ. Kiel & Gregory A. Thomas Banking Groundwaterin California:Who Owns

the Aquifer Storage Space?, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 2003, at 25.

143. See supra text accompanying notes 26-41.
144. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 446-47 (Cal. 1983). See
also ScoTr S. SLATER, 1 CALIFORNIA WATER LAW AND POLICY §§ 12.02, 13.11 (2007). Slater contends that California's judicially-declared public trust doctrine does not pertain
to California's percolating ground water, premised on the observation that such water
"does not constitute a navigable waterway under any stretch of the imagination." Id. §
13.11. This conclusion seems inconsistent with Slater's reading of California Constitution, Art. X, Section 2, extending that article's reasonable use requirement to ground
water. Id. § 12.02.
145. See, e.g. ALAsKA STAT. § 46.15.080(a) (2008); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN § 45-153
(2008); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 105, 1253, 1255, 1257 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN §§ 42202B, 42-203A, 42-222 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-711 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. §
85-2-311(3); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-204, 46-234, 46-289 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
533.370 (2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-6, -7, 72-12-3(E) (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6104-06(4) (2008); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 536.410, 537.153, 537.170 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 46-2A-9 (2008); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.134(b) (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. §
73-3-8(4) (2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.290 (2008); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-931
(2008). Colorado does not have a public interest review requirement, and Oklahoma
had one, but eliminated it in 1963. But see OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 82 §1085.2 (discussing
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water right is regarded as a pure real property interest with no public
encumbrance, the outcome could differ.'46
While it is common that state statutes pertaining to intrastate, interbasin transfers of water rights, or petitions to change the nature or
place of use of existing water rights, apply essentially similar substantive
standards to such transfers or changes, such statutory provisions are by
no means uniform. Conflict of law problems may therefore exist in
this area as well.
States' laws may differ as to the salvaged water doctrine. In California, for example, where a water user uses water more efficiently, the
water user may market the salvaged water.'47 If state law does not protect salvaged water, in a prior appropriation state the water is typically
regarded as abandoned and available for subordinate appropriators to
use. 148
State laws may also differ with respect to the limitation of the
amount of ground water that the state will permit or allow one to withdraw, based on an estimate of the water available for withdrawal.
These protections are normally stated in terms of "safe"'' 41 or "sustained" yield.' The Oklahoma groundwater statute, for example, prothat the Water Resource Board shall develop plans to meet the needs of the people of
Oklahoma).
146. But seeJoseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law,
61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 260 (1990) ("[W]ater rights have less protection than most
other property rights for several reasons... (a) because their existence may intrude on
a public common, they are subject to several original public prior claims, such as the
navigational servitude and the public trust, and to laws protecting commons, such as
water pollution laws; (b) their original definition, limited to beneficial and nonwasteful uses, imposes limits beyond those that constrain most property rights; (c)
insofar as water rights (unlike most other property rights) are granted by permit, they
are subject to constraints articulated in the permits.").
147. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1201, 1244 (2008).
148. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321, 1325,
1327 (Colo. 1974). See also JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER

RESOURCES 182-89 (4th ed. 2006) (examining salvage issues in prior appropriation
cases).
149.

See, e.g., UTrON TRANSBOUNDARY RES. CTR. MODEL INTERSTATE WATER

COMPACT, art. III § K (Jerome Muys, George W. Sherk & Marilyn C. O'Leary 2006),
("Safe Annual Yield: The amount of water that can be withdrawn annually from a
surface or sub-surface water resource without serious water quality, net storage, environmental or social consequences.").
150. Marcus Moench, Groundwater: The Challenge of Monitoring and Management, in
THE

WNORLD'S

WATER

2004-2005,

THE

BIENNIAL

REPORT

ON

FRESHWATER

RESOURCE 79, 80 (Island Press 2004). ("Aquifer 'sustained yield' is defined as the
amount of water than can be pumped from a given hydrological unit without depleting
the stock of water in storage. When extraction exceeds recharge aquifers are generally
described as suffering from overdraft or overextraction, the primary warning sign that
management may be required."). Predictions regarding the amount of ground water
that can be reproduced in annual cycles, which predictions are typically based on "recharge," precipitation, evapotranspiration, previous withdrawal, etc., are most appropriate where disconnected, unconfined, alluvial aquifers are involved. Where connate
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vides for the determination of maximum annual yield of groundwater
basins."'
A simple, purely hydrological definition of safe yield would allow the
extraction of no more water annually than is recharged-naturally or
artificially-annually.... If we are to allow the meaningful exploitation of water at all in arid regions, however, the concept of safe yield
must allow for a greater rate of annual withdrawal than annual recharge.
South Dakota's water code prohibits use of ground water in
North Dakota'54 and Monamounts above average annual recharge.'
55
tana statutes authorize public officers to reserve water supplies for
future use, thereby encumbering the current grant of permits for appropriation of ground or surface waters. In Kansas, the state legislature reserves to itself the right to establish a "minimum desirable
streamflow for any watercourse" in the state, thereby limiting the chief
engineer's approval of proposals to appropriate water from that watercourse.'
Instream flow statutes have become more common, as in
Oregon... and Nebraska.'
In recent years, political subdivisions, frequently known as management districts, increasingly manage ground water, particularly
where there has been legislative or administrative concern that ground
water supplies may be insufficient for current and future needs or
there is a threat of overuse. Arizona's groundwater code created "Active Management Areas" in the Santa Cruz, Prescott, Pinal, and Tucson
regions, for the purpose of establishing safe-yield goals. 9 In Kansas,
"Ground Water Management Districts" recommend rules for state implementation and have created "intensive ground water use control

or fossil aquifers are at issue, predicting the amount of water in storage is more difficult.
151. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82 § 1020.5 (2008), (In determining maximum yield of
groundwater, the Water Resource Board shall consider "(1) ... the total land area
overlying the basin or subbasin; (2) the amount of water in storage in the basin or
subbasin; (3) the rate of recharge to the basin or subbasin and total discharge from the
basin or subbasin; (4) the transmissibility of the basin or subbasin; and (5) the possibility of pollution of the basin or subbasin from natural sources.").
152. DELLAPENNA, supranote 1, at 18-47.
153. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46-6-3.1 (2008).
154. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-31 (2007).
155. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316 (2007).
156. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-703a (2006).
157. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.334 (2008). See also Janet Neuman, Anne Squier & Gail
Achterman, Sometimes a Great Notion: Oregon's Instream Flow Experiments, 36 ENvTL. L.
1125, 1129-130 (2006).
158. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-2,107 to -2,119 (2008).
159. Jack A. Vincent, What Lies Beneath: The Inherent Dangers of the Central Arizona
GroundwaterReplenishment District, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 857, 862-63 (2006).
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areas."" Montana utilizes "controlled ground water areas.
In Nevada, the state integrates ground and surface water management by
basin, typically defined by topographic contours.'62 The state has designated 111 of these 256 basins and sub-basins for special management, with another ten basins having partial designation.'
Texas utilizes local "ground water management areas" with limited powers to
regulate ground water pumping.'" Where such management districts
are adjacent to state lines and overlapping common ground water bodies, conflict may exist between these organizations' objectives.
Conflict of law issues may also arise between the application of state
and federal law, giving due respect for the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. Although neither the Articles of Confederation of
the original thirteen states nor the Constitution transfer the states'
right and responsibility to control and manage natural resources to the
federal government, Congress has more recently enacted statutes,
premised primarily on the Interstate Commerce Clause, that affect
both intrastate and interstate natural resources. With respect to interstate surface water bodies, those relating to waterborne commerce are
generally consolidated under the rubric of "navigational servitude."'6 "
"Reserved" rights to natural resources, including ground water,"' are
implied from congressional action reserving federal land for specific
uses from the more general multiple-use characteristics with which the
federally-owned lands are endowed. More modern national environmental legislation, also apparently premised on the Commerce Clause,
imposes an as yet ill-defined "environmental servitude" upon natural
resources. According to Dellapenna:

160. SeeJohn C. Peck, GroundwaterManagement in Kansas: A Brief History and Assessment, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 441, 445, 455 (2006) (examining several types of
Groundwater Management District regulations, including the creation of "intensive
ground water use control areas").
161. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-506 (2007).
162. Department of Conservation & Natural Resources: Division of Water Resources,
Nevada State Water Plan, S. 4-1, -22, available at

http://water.nv.gov/WaterPlanning/wat-plan/ptl-cont.cfm.
163. E-mail from Robert H. Zeisloft, P.E., Section Chief, Surface Water and Adjudication Sections, Nevada Division of Water Resources (October 14, 2008) (on file with
The University of Denver Water Law Review). See generally http://water.nv.gov/ (under
"Mapping/GIS" tab, follow "Basin Boundary Map" hyperlink) (map lists Nevada's basins and subbasins and the designation of each).
164. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 35.004 (2007).
165. Gilbert L. Finnell, Jr., Public Access to Coastal Public Property:Judicial Theories and
the Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L. REv. 627, 628 (1988).
166. See Robert T. Anderson, Professor of Law, Univ. of Wash. School of Law, Indian
Reserved Water Rights - Legal Overview, at A.B.A. Section of Environment, Energy and
Resources 20th Annual Water Law Conference, (Feb. 21-22, 2002) (citing cases where
federal reserved rights apply to groundwater).
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Congress has not adopted a preemptive federal statute, although
Congress has acted to deal with saltwater intrusion, public drinking
water sources, and certain groundwater polluting sources. [citing e.g.,
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1452,1454(h);
Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 43 U.S.C. § 3 0 0 .g-l; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 to 6987; and
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601.] Congress, however, has left allocating water quantitatively generally to the states.
Notwithstanding these federal legal overlays, which are not insignificant, modern state legislatures and administrations continue to
assume their right and responsibility to manage and control natural
resources, including water. Federal assertion of the "navigational servitude" to ground water seems inappropriate, as ground water does not
support waterborne commerce. It is generally agreed that the U.S.
Supreme Court, in 1976, found that federal reserved rights apply to
ground water in Cappaert v. United States.'6' The implication of the
more general "environmental servitude" resulting from national environmental legislation affecting ground water is less clear. The basis
and effect of that legislation, combined with the quantification and
state-recognition of the water right thereby created, make the implication less precise, particularly given the reservation of state regulatory
authority also contained in numerous federal water (i.e., Reclamation)
statutes. The result is a cloudier, and often contentious, definition of
the particular effect of the federal statutory overlay.
VI. ADMINISTRATION OF SHARED GROUNDWATER BASINS:

LESS IS MORE
Divided administration is the status quo with respect to state ad-

ministration of shared groundwater basins. And, so long as claims for
167. DELLAPENNA, supra note 1, at 19-18.
168. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 143 (1976). See also In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source (Gila III), 989
P.2d 739, 747 (Ariz. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1250 (2000). But see Debbie Shosteck,
Beyond Reserved Rights: Tribal Control over GroundwaterResources in a Cold Winters Climate,
28 COLUM.J. ENVrL. L. 325, 331, 338, 344, 361 (2003) ("Gingerly evading the issue of
whether the Winters doctrine holds true for groundwater, the [U.S. Supreme] Court
concluded that the water in Devil's Hole was actually surface water.") ("The Court's
emphasis on state sovereignty, disinclination towards creating federal common law,
and tendency to narrow the federal reserved rights doctrine, indicate that the groundwater issue would not fare well if the Court ultimately encounters it. Despite the strong
reasoning enunciated by the Arizona Supreme Court and favorable precedent espoused in Winters and Cappaert, the Court will likely reject the idea of a reserved right

to groundwater.") ("Assuming a court determines that tribes indeed maintain a preemptive right to oversee their own groundwater resources, it remains unclear how an
aquifer underlying both reservation and state land would be managed according to a
dual legal regime.").

Issue 1

LIMITED APPROACH TO MULTI-STATE MANAGEMENT

the use of water do not approach total water available to be administered, divided administration works. When claims do exceed supply,
however, two outcomes are predictable: a race to the finish or an
agreement, either one potentially leading to equitable apportionment.
Professor Abrams ultimately concluded, in 2002, that the security of a
state's "umbrella" may not be all that good; rather that "secure" water
rights may be later made less secure if equitable apportionment reallocates interstate water due to inefficient use." Again, security isn't everything. The watershed management approach has somewhat revised
the positive view of multi-state division (apportionment) of interstate
surface water systems.'7" Another alternative is to approach the shared
resource from the perspective of agreeing upon the management tasks
accomplishable without dividing the resource. These lesser tasks, if
accomplished, may in fact produce more results in terms of managing
interstate groundwater resources than would reaching an agreement
splitting those resources.
Marcus Moench recommended an approach exemplifying "less is
more." His suggestion is to utilize "simple data" and "direct measures
of groundwater conditions as a basis for groundwater systems management, particularly including data regarding groundwater levels and
water quality, rather than mass balance recharge-extraction equations. 7 ' Indeed these are the equations upon which water resource
Moench recommends simplicity in the
managers more typically rely.'
face of hydrogeologic complexity:
Quantifying the water balance within aquifers, for example, requires
quantitative estimates of deep groundwater inflow from other aquifers, groundwater discharge to streams, evapotranspiration by plants,
and a wide variety of other factors. These factors often vary from year
to year and require extensive recording periods (and assumptions of
stable climatic conditions) to develop stable quantitative estimates. In
addition, evaluation is complicated where boundaries of aquifers
cannot be clearly identified-a common situation. Without clear
boundaries, it is often difficult to accurately evaluate either recharge
or extraction.]7

169. Robert Haskell Abrams, Interstate Water Allocation: A Contemporary Primerfor Eastern States, 25 U. ARK. LrITLE ROCK L. REV. 155, 168-69 (2002).
170. See Robert E. Beck, The Regulated Riparian Model Water Code: Blueprintfor Twenty
First Century Water Management, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLT' REV. 113, 145
(2000).
171. Moench, supra note 150, at 97.
172. Id.("In the groundwater case, managers often cannot develop effective management and allocation systems because they rely on concepts of sustained yield but
cannot generate the basic scientific and monitoring data required to translate such
concepts into practical tools for management.").
173. Id. at 80.
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Moench also suggests:
Managers should also use some other simple indicators. These can
include key groundwater quality parameters and operational well
characteristics. When combined with existing hydro-geological information, they can provide a foundation for monitoring groundwater conditions at all levels from local regions or aquifers to global assessments. Furthermore, because each of these indicators is a direct
neasure, the level of uncertainty inherent in the measure itself is
much lower than with extraction and recharge estimates. 7'
Moench's proposal, which is applicable to the basis for the approval
of groundwater withdrawals, suggests an approach for interstate managerial structure as well: states should develop limited agreements between themselves premised on the known characteristics of groundwater systems, rather than on their unbounded unknowns.
Professor Leshy's suggestion that federal support for state managerial programs "earmarked solely to improve state water management measurement, adjudication and administration of water rights ''175 is also
helpful, as such support would facilitate development of the more precise data necessary to understand and manage interstate groundwater
resources, supporting the development of limited managerial agreements. Professor Sax' suggestion of contractually created regulatory
structures is also apt:
[B]etween pure localism and total centralization of authority there is
a wide range of intermediate choices. Recent efforts to deal with regional water problems, as on the Platte River, the Rio Grande, the
Colorado, and the Sacramento/San Joaquin, have spawned some
rather novel sorts of collaborative entities, borne out of negotiation
(and sometimes litigation). They bring local stakeholders together
with state and federal officials, generating new forms of governance
that are essentially created contractually, rather than through the political process. One interesting question ... is whether we are seeing
viable new institutional arrangements being fitted to the hydrological

174. Id. at 97-98.
175. John D. Leshy, Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law, The FederalRole in Water Management in the West: Time for New Thinking?, at A.B.A. Section of Environment, Energy and Resources 21st Annual Water Law
Conference (Feb. 20-21, 2003) ("The withdrawal of federal dollars for water infrastruc-

ture has itself placed more financial demands on the states. Federal environmental
laws have made the state's management job more difficult. And the general stream

adjudications have proved more difficult, lengthy and expensive to litigate than anyone
thought possible.").
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away of some of the old boundaries
realities, and a genuine
76 withering
and the old politics."
Where interstate water supplies are involved, states must decide
how they will live with their neighbors: through agreement and compromise, or through disagreement and litigation. Under the race paradigm, each state presumes that it can administer the entire resource,
notwithstanding its neighbor. Under the agreement paradigm, the
several states agree as to the maximum available extent of water in the
groundwater resource, apportion that total between themselves, and
thereafter agree (or disagree) how to administer the shared resource
within those limits.'" The first problem is, given the complexity of aquifers and that they cannot be observed, it is not easy to determine the
amount of available ground water. The second problem is the difficulty for a state to acquiesce that its neighbor should have as large an
apportionment as the neighboring state will want. Negotiation over
these issues may deter a successful outcome, perhaps interminably,
causing the agreement paradigm to revert to the race paradigm, and
thus to equitable apportionment.
The course through agreement and compromise has traditionally
been thought to be implemented exclusively through compact thus
avoiding equitable apportionment and congressional intervention.
Interstate compacts, authorized and entered pursuant to the Compact
Clause," are unfortunately difficult to put in place, as they require the
approval of state political bodies (legislatures) and become frozen instruments difficult to modify with changing circumstances once the
states obtain Congressional imprimatur."'°
176. Joseph L. Sax, Issues in the Watershed Management Movement, Keynote Address at the A.B.A. Section on Environment, Energy and Resources 19' Annual Water
Law Conference, (Feb 15, 2001).
177. See, e.g., Susan J. Buck, Gregory W. Gleason & Mitchel S. Jofuku, "The Institutional Imperative": Resolving TransboundaryWater Conflicts in Arid Agricultural Regions of the
United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States, 33 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 595, 620-21

(1993).
178. See Muys et al., supra note 149, at art. III § M ("Subsurface water: All waters
below the surface of the ground whether or not hydrologically connected to surface
waters."). See generally Jerome C. Muys, Muys & Associates, P.C., Washington, D.C.,
Beyond Allocation: Equitable Apportionment and Interstate Watershed Protection and Management, at the A.B.A. Section of Environment, Energy and Resources 19th Annual Water
Law Conference (Feb. 15-16, 2001) (explaining that equitable apportionment byjudi-

cial decision accomplishes the same thing as interstate compacts); Charles T. DuMars,
Professor of Law, Univ, of N.M. School of Law, InterjurisdictionalCompacts as Tools for
Watershed Management, at the A.B.A. Section of Environment, Energy and Resources

19th Annual Water Law Conference (Feb. 15-16, 2001) (discussing cases where compacts were useful).
179.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.

180.

Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: Mien the Virtue of Perma-

nence Becomes the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 150 (2003).
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Negotiation compromise among states is still the best apportionment
vehicle, but in many cases the product of negotiation - interstate
compacts - merely postpones the exercise of original jurisdiction. A
compact is usually negotiated as a substitute for a Supreme Court equitable apportionment. But, when it becomes necessary to litigate the
meaning of a compact term or concept, a court will turn to the law of
equitable apportionment to ascertain the intent of the drafters.'
Agreements between agencies or political subdivisions of states'2
may be more flexible and more particularly designed to the situation
presented by different reservoirs and different state-law conflict problems. The advantages of such an approach are clear, even though
agreement may be difficult to reach. A primary advantage is that it
permits leaving unresolved, for the time being or for some extended
period, the thorny issue of allocation of the resource. Allocation of the
resource is, of course, the primary political concern, but may not be
the primary resource management concern. States could pursue management of the shared resource in both states' common interest without first accomplishing strict allocation. The problem, however, is to
find a means to manage the resource while allowing a state to grant
new authority to withdraw water from the shared resource, without
encouraging another involved state to veto that grant.
181. A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and Restated, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 381, 410-11 (1985).
182. The question whether an association of governments in different states, be they
the sovereign states themselves, or another entity like an agency or a political subdivision, constitutes a "compact" is not a question of who the parties are, but what the
effect of the association is on the political power of Congress. The U.S. Supreme
Court has pointed out that not all "compacts" or "agreements" invoke the Compact
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, article I, section 10, clause 3. See New Hampshire v.
Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976) (boundary first established by King George II; court explained that "[t] he application of the Compact Clause is limited to agreements that are
directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political
power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of
the United States") (quoting from and relying upon Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503
(1893) (boundary established by charters of English sovereigns (James I, Charles II) by
whom colonies of Virginia and North Carolina were formed)); ; North Carolina v.
Tennessee, 235 U.S. 1 (1914) (boundary established by cession act of North Carolina
Legislature and later marked out by Commissioners appointed by North and Carolina
and Tennessee); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1977)
(creation of interstate agency (Multistate Tax Commission) by seven states, laterjoined
by 14 other states, did not violate Compact Clause). See alsoJennifer Evans, Transboundary Groundwater in New Mexico, Texas and Mexico: State and Local Legal Remedies to a
Challenge Between Cities, States, and Nations, 30 WM. & MARY ENvrL. L. & POL'Y REv. 471,

488-89, 503 (2006) ("A regional groundwater agreement can also survive an application of the foreign affairs exclusivity or dormant foreign affairs cases."). Thus, the
modern attitude about multi-state (some say "regional") government is to permit its
enhancement, not judicially preclude it. Only in those cases where states are trying to
politically aggrandize themselves, at the expense of Congress, is judicial intervention
against multi-state agreements likely to occur.
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The best approach is one which is built upon the specific situation
in which it finds itself."' The specific hydrologic characteristics of the
groundwater resource may well dictate the better form of management
structure, the relevant stakeholders, and the appropriate relationship
between the states possessing sovereign interests in the resource.
What might more limited agreements address? Two Colorado
River agreements suggest some possibilities. In 1973, the United States
and Mexico executed Minute 242184 to the 1944 U.S.-Mexico Water
Treaty.'8 5 Minute 242 established a salinity standard comparing water
quality at Morelos Dam with water quality at Imperial Dam, authorized
the Wellton-Mohawk Bypass Drain, and limited groundwater pumping
within 5 miles of the international boundary.'8 The agreement's limited scope permitted its accomplishment. States might fashion a similar agreement establishing ground water chemistry characteristics at
specific monitoring wells and prescribing changed use behaviors that
might be required in the event of change of those characteristics.
The Secretary of the Interior has now adopted Interim Guidelines
for the Operation of Lake Powell and Lake Mead.' 7 The guidelines are
premised on an agreement and proposal between Colorado River BaOne of the reasons
sin states that share the river's resource values.'
for success of that interstate agreement was a willingness on the part of
the participants to limit the scope, both in breadth and time, of the
matters necessary to be agreed upon. The states set aside other matters, for the time being, , including differences in interpretation of
Consistent with this limitation approach,
seminal legal questions.'
states might strike agreements regarding solution of conflict of law
problems; agreements regarding the collection of data and well monitoring; agreements limiting extraction to given volumes in respective
183. See Evans, supra note 182, at 479 ("A case-by-case approach that entails basinoriented agreements is often advocated by scholars." (citation omitted)).
184. Agreement confirming Minute no. 242 of the International Boundary and Water Commission, U.S.- Mex., Aug. 30, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1968 (setting forth a permanent
and definitive solution to the international problem of the salinity of the Colorado
River) (recognized and implemented by the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act,
June 24, 1974, 88 Stat. 266).
185. U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219 (respecting utilization of
waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and the Rio Grande).
186. International Boundary and Water Commission, Minute 242: Permanent and
Definitive Solution to the InternationalProblem of the Salinity of the Colorado River, Aug. 30,
1973, available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/min242.pdf.
187. Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Interim Guidelinesfor Lower Basin Shortages
and Coordinated Operations for Lakes Powell and Mead, (2005), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies.html.
188. SeeJames H. Davenport, Softening the Divides: The Seven ColoradoRiver Basin States'
Recommendation to the Secretary of the InteriorRegardingLower Basin Shortage Guidelines and
the Operation of Lakes Mead and Powell in Low Reservoir Conditions, 10 U. DENV. WATER L.
REV. 287, 290, 292-93 (2007).
189. Id. at 293-94.
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states; agreements establishing recognized monitoring wells and management choices given preset water level elevations; agreements requiring conservation activity of existing or future water users; agreements
requiring groundwater extraction or use measurement systems; agreements establishing ground water chemistry characterization and monitoring for change; or other less encompassing details.
States may also consider shared administration of interstate
groundwater basins. 9 ° First, shared administration addresses the principal shared water problem - race to consumption. Second, shared
administration comports with developing concerns regarding sustainability, regional formats of growth management, and wet growth philosophy. 9 ' Shared management is more likely sized to the regional
scale of potential drought. It establishes a better framework upon
which to organize data from a region regarding an underground
source's geology, hydrologic characteristics, and water level. The U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized interstate organizations designed to
address regional problems since 1977.9
States should exercise caution to not to bite off more than they can
chew. States should limit agreements regulating resources in their duration, so that the agreements can accommodate new politics, new science, or new knowledge about the resource. It is better to tackle reasonably-sized problems, although in the context of groundwater resources this may be difficult given their size and relatively unknown
characteristics. States should fashion agreement documents so that
they are capable of alteration when consensus dictates. Agreement
regarding smaller or component differences may lead to agreement
regarding larger, overarching differences.
CONCLUSION
Interstate groundwater bodies are large and complex. They do not
respect state boundaries. The law with respect to intrastate ground
water is somewhat uniform but also somewhat in conflict, which sug190.

See MODEL

WATER SHARING AGREEMENTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

4 (Stephen E. Draper ed., 2002).
191.
CRAIG ANTHONY (TONY) ARNOLD ET AL., WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER
LAW CONTROL LAND USE? 8 (2005).
192.
See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 456, 479 (1977)

(holding that an interstate tax organization does not violate Compact Clause of U.S.
constitution). State planning and management of natural resources is premised on
the state's police power and its purpose of protecting the public health and safety.
Local land use planning is premised on municipal power, arising from State constitutional or statutory origins, or the State's statutorily conferred "police power." Interjurisdictional planning organizations accomplish regional planning by borrowing these
municipal or police power authorities through inter- or multi-jurisdictional agree-

ments. Interstate compacts or lesser agreements can aid in the accomplishment of
multi-state regional planning.
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gests potential dissention among water rights owners and states when it
comes to interstate resources. Generalization regarding uniformity or
disparity of the law between the states is probably not very useful, as
one must first examine the particular case to evaluate the difficulty of
resolving potentially inconsistent state groundwater law.
The traditional view has been that there are only three ways to resolve interstate competition: equitable apportionment, congressional
intervention, or interstate compact. But a fourth alternative exists. Do
less and thus do more. Act in the present. Be mindful of the future.
Let perpetuity take care of itself. Appraise the shared resource with all
the precision currently available, but leave room for surprise. Share
management where possible, so as to contemplate a common good, if
in fact individual opportunity can also be accommodated. Eschew centralization. Let the variety and heterogeneity of groundwater resources
suggest the best course, treating them individually. Permit each set of
states, as appropriate to the specific aquifer, to ascertain the best approach for that aquifer. Accept the federal interest in both intrastate
and interstate groundwater systems and coordinate it with the states'
managerial responsibilities. Balance the economic, social, health, aesthetic, and recreational values of water, in the face of growing demand,
shortening supply, and now climate change. Such an approach sounds
challenging, but less is more.
ARTICLE UPDATE
The following is a brief update on the issues presented in James
Davenport's prior work in the University of Denver Water Law Review,
"Softening the Divides: The Seven Colorado River Basin States' Recommendation to the Secretary of the Interior Regarding Lower Basin
Shortage Guidelines and the Operate of Lakes Mead and Powell in
Law Reservoir Conditions," found at 10 University of Denver Water
Law Review 287 (2007).
- The Editors

In December 2007, the Secretary of the Interior signed the Record of Decision regarding the Final Environmental Impact Statement
for the Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages
and Coordinated Operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead.'93 The
Guidelines, based upon the Preferred Alternative and public input, will

193. Record of Decision - Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin
Shortages and Coordinated Operation for Lake Powell and Lake Mead 1 (December
at
available
2007),
http ://www.usbr.gov/lc/region /programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 12

remain in effect through 2025.' The Secretary will use the Guidelines
to: 1) determine the circumstances under which the Secretary would
reduce the annual amount of water available for consumptive use from
Lake Mead to the Colorado River Lower Division; 2) define the coordinated operation of Lake Powell and Lake Mead to improve the operation of both reservoirs, especially under low reservoir conditions; 3)
allow for storage and delivery of conserved Colorado River system and
non-system in Lake Mead particularly under drought conditions; and
4) determine those conditions under which the Secretary may declare
the availability of surplus water for use within the Lower Division
states.9

194.
195.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 7-8.

